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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SUBJECT: EUROPEAN BRIEF [REDACTED] FOR 2 FEBRUARY 1990. b3
FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

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1. GERMANYS: MODROW-FLOATS UNIFICATION PROPOSAL b3
EAST GERMAN PREMIER MODROW'S UNIFICATION PLAN WILL ONLY
MARGINALLY IMPROVE THE COMMUNISTS' PROSPECTS IN NEXT MONTH'S FREE
ELECTIONS BUT COULD SHARPEN WEST GERMAN PUBLIC DEBATE OVER WHETHER
NEUTRALITY SHOULD BE THE PRICE FOR UNITY. b3

MODROW YESTERDAY ANNOUNCED A FOUR-STEP PLAN FOR GERMAN
UNIFICATION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT FOUR POWER COOPERATION AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION THROUGH CSCE WOULD BE PREREQUISITES. HE ALSO SAID THE
TWO GERMANYS SHOULD HONOR THEIR ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS BUT SUGGESTED
UNIFICATION WOULD INVOLVE SOME TYPE OF MILITARY NEUTRALITY, POSSIBLY
EVEN BEFORE A FINAL PEACE TREATY. b3

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BY PLACING HIS PROPOSAL IN THE CONTEXT OF FOUR POWER COOPERATION AND THE CSCE PROCESS, MODROW TOOK PAINS TO ENSURE HIS PROPOSALS AGREE WITH CURRENT SOVIET THINKING. HE PROBABLY HOPES TO EASE PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR RAPID UNIFICATION BY IDENTIFYING HIS BELEAGUERED GOVERNMENT WITH THE INCREASINGLY POPULAR GOAL OF A UNIFIED GERMANY. HE ALMOST CERTAINLY WANTS TO BOOST THE COMMUNISTS' POOR ELECTORAL PROSPECTS BY BEING THE FIRST EAST GERMAN POLITICIAN WITH A DEFINITE UNIFICATION PLAN; HIS EFFORTS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT LIKELY TO SUCCEED. b3

MODROW'S AMBIGUOUS REMARKS ON NEUTRALITY ARE ALSO AIMED AT MANY WEST GERMANS.

MODROW NO DOUBT ALSO HOPES TO ENCOURAGE THOSE WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS WHO WANT TO MINIMIZE A UNIFIED GERMANY'S TIES TO NATO.

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MODROW HAS PUBLICLY SAID HE DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL WITH THE SOVIETS DURING HIS VISIT THIS WEEK, AND MOSCOW PROBABLY HAD SOME INFLUENCE OVER THE TERMS OF THE PLAN. THE ROLE OF THE FOUR POWERS AND THE ALLIANCES, THE IMPLICATION THAT UNIFICATION WOULD BE LENGTHY, AND THE CONTINUED OBSERVANCE OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS DURING THE PROCESS ARE CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUSLY STATED SOVIET VIEWS ON HOW UNIFICATION SHOULD EVOLVE. MOSCOW PROBABLY WILL WELCOME MODROW'S NOTION OF POSTPONING PEACE TREATY TALKS UNTIL AFTER UNIFICATION HAS OCCURRED, VIEWING IT AS LEGITIMIZING THE PRESENCE OF US AND SOVIET TROOPS IN GERMANY DURING THE UNIFICATION PROCESS, WHICH MOSCOW BELIEVES IS DESIRABLE FOR THE STABILITY OF EAST GERMANY. b3

THE SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY WILL LARGELY SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY BE SOMEWHAT UNEASY ABOUT MODROW'S COMMENTS ON GERMAN NEUTRALITY. THEIR PUBLIC RESERVATIONS ABOUT UNIFICATION, HOWEVER, HAVE LOST FORCE SINCE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAS ACKNOWLEDGED ITS INEVITABILITY AND SINCE EAST BERLIN HAS TABLED AN OUTLINE FOR THE PROCESS. MOSCOW PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT MODROW'S SPEECH WILL HELP MAINTAIN SHORT-TERM STABILITY IN EAST GERMANY AND THAT IT PUTS BONN ON NOTICE OF THE NECESSITY FOR AN ORDERED PROCEDURE TO TAKE FOUR POWER RIGHTS INTO ACCOUNT. MOSCOW MAY ALSO VIEW THE PRECONDITIONS LAID OUT BY MODROW AS USEFUL FOR SLOWING UNIFICATION. BUT THE SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZE THEY HAVE FEW CARDS TO PLAY AND PROBABLY WILL FOCUS ON SAFEGUARDING THEIR OWN INTERESTS AS THE PROCESS UNFOLDS. b3

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3. BULGARIA: PRIME MINISTER, CABINET RESIGN [REDACTED] b3

THE RESIGNATION OF BULGARIA'S PRIME MINISTER AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS YESTERDAY AND THE FAILURE OF THE PARTY CONGRESS TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL REFORMS SIGNAL A POLITICAL CRISIS THAT MAY LEAD TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. [REDACTED] b3

PRIME MINISTER GEORGI ATANASOV AND HIS CABINET RESIGNED YESTERDAY UNDER INTENSE CRITICISM AT THE PARTY CONGRESS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MORE REASSIGNMENTS AND PURGES WILL BE ANNOUNCED TODAY. b3

THE CONGRESS PASSED NEW PARTY STATUTES YESTERDAY TO REPLACE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND POLITBURO, SEPARATE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, ELIMINATE THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRATIC-CENTRALISM, AND LIMIT THE NUMBER OF TERMS PARTY LEADERS MAY SERVE. MORE RADICAL REFORMS, SUCH AS CHANGING THE PARTY'S NAME AND ELIMINATING PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN WORKPLACES, HOWEVER, WERE NOT APPROVED, LEADING A REFORMIST FACTION TO ANNOUNCE IT WILL CREATE A SEPARATE BULGARIAN SOCIALIST PARTY NEXT WEEK. b3

[REDACTED] THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CABINET AND FAILURE OF THE PARTY CONGRESS TO ADOPT SIGNIFICANT REFORMS SHOW THE INABILITY OF THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP TO RESPOND TO PARTY AND PUBLIC DISCONTENT, PARTICULARLY OVER ECONOMIC WOES. ATANASOV'S GROWING UNPOPULARITY AND ASSOCIATION WITH THE ZHIVKOV REGIME MADE HIS RESIGNATION UNAVOIDABLE. THE RESIGNATION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, HOWEVER, STEMMED FROM ITS FAILURE TO ADDRESS BULGARIA'S GROWING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. b3

PETAR MLADENOV PROBABLY WILL RESIGN AS PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY BUT REMAIN HEAD OF STATE. SOME KEY HARDLINE PARTY LEADERS ARE LIKELY TO FALL AS THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS REPLACED BY A SMALLER SUPREME COUNCIL. REFORMIST POLITBURO MEMBERS ALEKSANDER LILOV AND ANDREY LUKANOV WILL PROBABLY BECOME PARTY LEADER AND PRIME MINISTER, RESPECTIVELY. b3

THE REGIME HOPES THE CHANGES WILL HELP IT REGAIN CREDIBILITY, AND IT PROBABLY WILL SEEK TO ENTICE THE OPPOSITION UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES INTO A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHIN A FEW WEEKS, IMPLICATING THE UDF IN THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND UNDERCUTTING ITS POPULARITY BEFORE ELECTIONS SET FOR MAY. THE UDF REJECTED SUCH CALLS EARLIER THIS WEEK AND PROBABLY WILL PRESS FOR A CARETAKER GOVERNMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS, BUT THE PUBLIC SENSE OF A DEEPENING CRISIS MAY FORCE IT TO JOIN A COALITION AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. b3

4. SYRIA IRAN: ALLIANCE OF CONVENIENCE LIKELY TO LAST [REDACTED] b3
DIFFERENCES OVER LEBANON ARE STRAINING, BUT WILL NOT BREAK, TIES BETWEEN DAMASCUS AND TEHRAN. b3

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PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THE TWO LEADERS AGREED TO IMPOSE
TIGHTER RESTRICTIONS ON THE CROSS-BORDER TRAVEL OF IRANIANS.

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5. ARAB STATES: CONSIDERING SUMMIT ON LEBANON b3
THE ARAB LEAGUE'S TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE--SAUDI ARABIA, MOROCCO,
AND ALGERIA--HAS CALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS ON CONVENING AN
EXTRAORDINARY SUMMIT TO CONSIDER THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY
STALEMATE IN LEBANON.

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: IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A SUMMIT WILL BE ORGANIZED ON
SHORT NOTICE, PARTICULARLY SINCE ARAB LEADERS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY
PREFER TO LEAVE THE LEBANON ISSUE TO THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE.
EGYPT--WHOSE ATTITUDE MAY BE DECISIVE--WILL BE LOATH TO JEOPARDIZE
ITS NEWLY RESTORED TIES TO SYRIA, AND FEW ARABS FEEL A SENSE OF
URGENCY OVER THE LATEST CHRISTIAN CLASHES. IF A LEAGUE SUMMIT IS
HELD, IT PROBABLY WILL BE AFTER THE REGULAR LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING NEXT MONTH AND COULD CONSIDER A VARIETY OF TOPICS, INCLUDING
JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS. b3

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MOSCOW'S URGENT PROGRAM TO INCREASE
PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS THIS YEAR IS HEADED FOR TROUBLE.
CONSUMER INDUSTRIES ACROSS THE COUNTRY ARE REPORTING SEVERE
SHORTAGES OF RAW MATERIALS, OFTEN BLAMING LOCAL PROTECTIONISM FOR
DISRUPTING THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES. SOME PRODUCERS REPORTEDLY ARE
REFUSING TO HONOR COMMITMENTS TO ENTERPRISES IN OTHER REPUBLICS ON
'ETHNIC GROUNDS,' DESPITE ORDERS FROM MOSCOW. b3

MOSCOW IS BETTING HEAVILY THAT IT CAN PRODUCE MORE
CONSUMER GOODS TO EASE POPULAR DISCONTENT AND BUY SUPPORT FOR
PERESTROYKA. TO DO THIS, IT HAS ATTEMPTED TO REASSERT CENTRAL
CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION, BUT ETHNIC CONFLICTS,
DECLINING LABOR DISCIPLINE, AND TRANSPORTATION BOTTLENECKS ARE

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HAMPERING THE EFFORT. MOREOVER, ENTERPRISE UNRESPONSIVENESS IS WEAKENING TRADITIONAL LEVERS OF CONTROL, SUCH AS PRODUCTION PLANS AND STATE ORDERS. AS A RESULT, MOSCOW'S CONSUMER PROGRAM IS LIKELY TO FALL WELL SHORT OF ITS GOALS. [REDACTED] b3

7. USSR: WARY AFGHANS SUPPORTING CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS [REDACTED] b3
THE SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED THAT RECENT EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT BY AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERS FOR THEIR MUSLIM "BROTHERS" IN THE USSR COULD FUEL DISCONTENT IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA. ACCORDING TO AN UNCONFIRMED PRESS REPORT, COMMANDER AHMAD SHAH MASOOD -AN ETHNIC TAJIK--ANNOUNCED PLANS SUNDAY FOR A RADIO STATION THAT HE HOPED WOULD REACH SOVIET TAJIK LISTENERS AND CALLED ON CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS TO REVOLT AGAINST SOVIET RULE.

[REDACTED] AFGHAN OPPPOSITION FORCES HAVE SENT WEAPONS, NARCOTICS, AND MONEY ACROSS THE BORDER TO SUBVERT TAJIKISTAN'S GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC STATE. [REDACTED] A TAJIK CITIZEN TRAINED IN SUBVERSION BY THE MUJAHEDIN HAS RECEIVED AN EIGHT-YEAR SENTENCE FOR ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES. [REDACTED] b3

SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE LONG BEEN APPREHENSIVE ABOUT A SPILLOVER OF ISLAMIC NATIONALIST ACTIVISM INTO SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA. MASOOD AND OTHER RESISTANCE LEADERS MAY HOPE TO FOMENT UNREST THERE TO INDUCE MOSCOW TO LIMIT ITS SUPPORT FOR THE KABUL REGIME. RELIGIOUS FERMENT IS NOT YET A MAJOR CAUSE OF UNREST IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, BUT ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY MIGHT PROVIDE A RALLYING POINT FOR GROWING DISCONTENT AMONG SOVIET MUSLIMS, ESPECIALLY IN BORDER REPUBLICS. [REDACTED] b3

8. IN BRIEF

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X--ROMANIA'S NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT, OPPOSITION PARTIES YESTERDAY AGREED TO FORM COALITION GOVERNMENT . . . FRONT APPARENTLY RETAINS KEY POSTS . . . OPPOSITION LIKELY TO CONTINUE CHALLENGING FRONT'S DOMINANCE. [REDACTED] b3

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